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The Problem of Paternal Motives 
Utilitas 25, no. 4 (2013): 446-462 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article I assess the ability of motivational accounts of paternalism to respond to a 
particular challenge: can its proponents adequately explain the source of the distinctive 
form of disrespect that animates this view? In particular I examine the recent argument 
put forward by Jonathan Quong that we can explain the presumptive wrong of 
paternalism by relying on a Rawlsian account of moral status. I challenge the plausibility 
of Quong’s argument, claiming that although this approach can provide a clear response 
to the explanatory challenge, it is only successful in doing so when it relies on the strength 
of its rival: the argument from personal autonomy. In doing so I illustrate that such 
responses are conceptually dependent on an account of respect for persons, and thus 
much of the relevant controversy is actually disagreement over how we respect other 
individuals. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Liberals have traditionally been concerned that the state may possess a tendency to treat 
citizens as incompetent by interfering in their lives with the intention to promote their 
well-being. Though such interferences may be motivated by good intentions, liberal 
critics argue that paternalistic interferences are necessarily disrespectful in some 
important normative sense. Since the government has good reason to avoid treating 
citizens disrespectfully, liberals argue that state interferences of this sort require a 
powerful justification. The onus lies with those who interfere. This, in short, is the 
background to the problem of paternalism. As Peter de Marneffe asserts, ‘Paternalism 
matters, then, because the moral limits to government authority over our choices 
matter.’1 
                                                          
1 Peter de Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2006), pp. 68–94, at 76. 
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The assumption within the common liberal response to this problem is that we can 
explain how such interferences are disrespectful, even though they are motivated by good 
intentions. In trying to explain this sense of disrespect generated by paternalism – the 
infantilizing aspect of the intervention – it has become common to trace the fault back to 
the motive of the act.2 
 
The Motivational Approach: Paternalistic interferences are actions intending 
to promote the well-being of an individual motivated by a negative judgement 
about her ability to advance her own well-being.  
 
I posit that this definitional strategy relies on a separate argument regarding respect for 
persons to explain why such actions are disrespectful. The field of candidates is broadly 
divided between two contrasting accounts that are segregated by their differing 
explanations of the grounding of this disrespect. In this article I argue that the 
motivational approach can answer the specific worry posed by de Marneffe – that such 
models cannot explain the origin of the disrespect inherent in the motive of a paternalistic 
act, by adopting either of these accounts. However, when comparing the two viable 
candidates to ground this explanation, we may have reason to prefer the traditional 
argument from autonomy over its recently suggested rival. My argument has five parts. 
In section II I detail de Marneffe’s initial worries regarding motivational accounts of 
paternalism. In section III I respond to this challenge by exploring a plausible response 
recently proposed by Jonathan Quong, who argues for a view based on a Rawlsian 
interpretation of moral status. However this position challenges the definitional accuracy 
of previous motivational accounts. Thus I discuss the plurality of plausible motivational 
                                                          
2 For examples of the motivational interpretation of paternalism, see John Kleinig, Paternalism 
(Manchester, 1983) p. 38; Donald Van De Veer, Paternalistic Intervention: The Bounds of Benevolence 
(Princeton, 1986), pp. 4–5; Joel Feinberg, Harm To Self (Oxford, 1986) pp. 23–4; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
‘Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine and Accommodation’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000), pp. 
205–50, at 215; Douglas N. Husak, ‘Legal Paternalism’, The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics, ed. H. 
LaFollette (Oxford, 2003), pp. 387–412, at 389; de Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’ p. 70; RichardH. Thaler 
and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (London, 2009), pp. 
5–6; Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford, 2011), pp. 80–3. This is not the only possible 
explanation of the harm of paternalistic interference. For a brief survey of alternatives, see Quong 
Liberalism without Perfection, pp. 74–80. 
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accounts and outline the reasons we might have for adopting these different approaches. 
In section IV I review the strength of the argument that moral status construed in a 
Rawlsian fashion can ground the presumptive wrong of paternalism. In section V I argue 
that we have reason to prefer its competitor: the traditional argument for autonomy. 
Finally, in section VI I conclude by exploring two further implications of my arguments. 
 
2. de Marneffe’s Critique 
 
In his 2006 article Avoiding Paternalism, Peter de Marneffe assesses the prospects for the 
project of reconciliation. That is the project of ‘seek[ing] to show that no widely 
supported policy is really paternalistic, by identifying a good nonpaternalistic 
justification for the seemingly paternalistic policies that most of us endorse’.3 In doing so 
he characterizes two methods of defining an act as paternalistic: motivational and 
justificatory.4 He defines the motivational interpretation of paternalism as follows: ‘a 
policy that limits a person’s choices is paternalistic toward that person if and only if the 
government adopts this policy because those in the relevant political process count the 
fact that it will benefit this person as a reason in its favour’.5 He rejects this account of 
paternalism because of its poor fit with the project of reconciliation.6 Instead a hybrid 
account of paternalism is proposed with the belief that it balances the strengths and 
weaknesses of the motivational and justificatory accounts.7 This conclusion mirrors de 
Marneffe’s own interest in the project of reconciliation and not our interest in assessing 
the motivational account. Those unsure of the benefits of this project may instead be 
inclined to interpret the tension identified as a reason to reject the project of 
                                                          
3 de Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, p. 68. 
4 While de Marneffe contrasts the two and argues that both suffer from weaknesses, it is only motivational 
accounts that concern us here. 
5 de Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, p. 70. 
6 de Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, pp. 70–1. 
7 de Marneffe argues that the project of reconciliation actually presupposes a hybrid account of paternalism 
that is defined as follows: ‘a government policy is paternalistic toward A if and only if (a) it limits A’s choices 
by deterring A from choosing to perform an action or by making it more difficult for A to perform it; (b) A 
prefers A’s own situation when A’s choices are not limited in this way; (c) the government has this policy 
only because those in the relevant political process believe or once believed that this policy will benefit A 
in some way, and (d) this policy cannot be fully justified without counting its benefits to A in its favour’ (de 
Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, pp. 73–4). Given that we are interested in motivational accounts and not 
the project of reconciliation, this definition need not concern us too much. 
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reconciliation. Indeed, as I discuss in the conclusion of this article, we may have good 
reason to accept the motivational account and thus reject the project of reconciliation. 
 
As an example of a motivational account of paternalism, de Marneffe identifies Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin’s well-known definition8 of paternalism, which has the following four 
criteria. Paternalism by A towards B may be characterized as behaviour 
 
(a) that is aimed to have (or to avoid) an effect on B or her sphere of legitimate 
agency; 
(b) that involves the substitution of A’s judgement or agency for B’s; 
(c) that is directed at B’s own interests or matters that legitimately lie within 
B’s control; 
(d) that is undertaken on the grounds that compared to B’s judgement or 
agency with respect to those interests or other matters, A regards her 
judgement or agency to be (or as likely to be), in some respect, superior to B’s. 
 
Shiffrin explicitly identifies the problematic characteristic of such acts as follows: 
 
The essential motive behind a paternalist act evinces a failure to respect either 
the capacity of the agent to judge, the capacity of the agent to act, or the 
propriety of the agent’s exerting control over a sphere that is legitimately her 
domain . . . As such, it directly expresses insufficient respect for the underlying 
valuable capacities, powers, and entitlements of the autonomous agent.9 
 
This model faces two prominent critiques. The first, pressed by de Marneffe, questions 
whether paternalistic motives are inherently insulting: 
 
                                                          
8 See Shiffrin, ‘Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine and Accommodation’, p. 218. 
9 Shiffrin, ‘Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine and Accommodation’, p. 220. 
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When a government official adopts a policy that someone does not want in 
order to benefit this same person, she assumes this person has an interest in 
this policy, or that there is a good reason for this person to prefer his own 
situation under this policy. In supporting an unwanted policy for a 
paternalistic reason, government officials therefore support this policy from 
the same general concern to protect or advance individuals’ interests that 
might properly motivate them to support any government policy. What is 
insulting about this?10 
 
The challenge can be stated as follows: 
 
The Explanatory Challenge: Interventions motivated by the intention to 
promote another’s well-being may be considered problematic if such acts are 
achieved through morally problematic means (coercion, deception, 
manipulation, etc.). However the motivation itself cannot be a source of 
disrespect when taken solely on its own merits. 
 
If the explanatory challenge is upheld, then the motivational approach to defining 
paternalism appears mistaken. De Marneffe rejects the explanation of the infantilizing 
aspect of paternalism offered by Shiffrin as unpersuasive, alongside a number of other 
potential explanations.11 That it can be explained by the process of substitution of 
judgement within the intervention is rejected because governments commonly do this in 
non-paternalistic situations. That it can be explained by appeal to the area of the 
paternalisee’s agency contravened by the intervener is rejected as this fails to describe 
the (insulting) manner in which the contravention takes place. That it can be explained 
by the failure of personal judgement attributed to the paternalisee is rejected because it 
is unclear why making judgements about what is best for oneself is more fundamental 
than the ability to judge what is best all things considered. An explanation from the sense 
of insult felt by the paternalisee is rejected because a person may be mistaken in his 
                                                          
10 de Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, p. 77. 
11 See de Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, pp. 77–81. 
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perceptions of the state’s actions. De Marneffe also denies that it can be explained by the 
disrespectful judgement of incompetence attributed to the paternalisee or the air of 
superiority assumed by the intervener (a view he attributes to Elizabeth Anderson).12 
This view is rejected because errors in reasoning and judgement are common and so to 
acknowledge this is simply to acknowledge that an individual’s rationality is imperfect. 
 
Finally, and most importantly for this argument, de Marneffe rejects explanations that 
rely on the violation of the moral status of the paternalisee because the success of this 
explanation is contingent on a further argument regarding the strength of the 
paternalistic reasons given by the intervener to justify his act. It is only if such reasons 
are always too weak to justify the interference that ‘an official . . . acting on these reasons 
would thereby show an objectionable disregard for a person’s legitimate interests in 
liberty’.13 This particular rejection is problematic for the motivational interpretation 
because, as I discuss in the next sections, the most suitable response to the challenge 
claims that the position should rely on a claim of moral status to explain the presumptive 
wrong of paternalism. 
 
3. A Response to de Marneffe and a Further Challenge 
 
We can find a compelling answer to the explanatory challenge in recent arguments 
provided by Jonathan Quong, who argues that the wrong of paternalism can be explained 
by an argument from the moral status of the paternalisee.14 This argument employs a 
specifically Rawlsian conception of the person based on the ideal of citizens as free and 
                                                          
12 See Elizabeth Anderson, ‘What is the Point of Equality?’, Ethics 109 (1999), pp. 287–337, at 301–2 and 
330. 
13 de Marneffe, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, p. 81. 
14 See Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, pp. 100–6. Quong claims that his argument does not contradict 
de Marneffe’s previous rejection of arguments from moral status because de Marneffe is searching for 
grounds for an absolute prohibition against paternalistic state action, whereas Quong is merely seeking to 
explain the presumptive wrong that characterizes paternalistic acts. To contradict Quong, de Marneffe 
would have to go further to show not only why arguments from the moral status of the paternalisee cannot 
form the basis of an absolute prohibition on paternalistic acts, but also why such an argument cannot form 
the basis of a more modest (presumptive) wrong. Given that Quong persuasively argues the case for his 
interpretation on these more moderate grounds, it is difficult to see how this stronger claim could be made 
without denying the importance of moral equality. 
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equal through their possession of the two moral powers.15 Quong contends that the 
presumptive wrong of paternalistic interventions stems from their violation of this 
conception of the person: ‘paternalism involves one person or group denying that 
another person or group has the necessary capacity, in a given context, to exercise the 
second of the two moral powers: the capacity to plan, revise, and rationally pursue their 
own conception of the good’.16 This forms the argument from moral status: 
 
The Argument from Moral Status: Since paternalistic acts deny the paternalisee 
the capacity to exercise the second moral power, they treat the paternalisee 
contrary to the manner in which the moral status attributed to them demands. 
 
However, the supporter of Shiffrin cannot simply employ this argument to defend the 
customary motivational definition because Quong’s position raises a seperate challenge 
for Shiffrin’s account.  
 
The Definitional Challenge: Shiffrin’s original definition mis-specifies the 
definition of paternalism because it relies on defining the concept according to 
the intervention contravening the paternalisee’s ‘legitimate sphere of control’. 
By relying on this element, the account is both over- and under-inclusive at the 
same time. 
 
The definition is over-inclusive because it misidentifies the target of paternalistic 
intervention in cases involving interventions to protect a third party. Consider the 
following example: 
 
Suppose, for example, I intervene to stop a parent from punishing his or her 
child because I believe my judgement is superior to the parent’s, and thus my 
                                                          
15 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 1993), p. 19, and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness A 
Restatement (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), pp. 18–24. 
16 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, p. 101. 
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actions will better promote the child’s well-being. On Shiffrin’s account I have 
acted paternalistically with regard to the parent, even though my aim was to 
promote the child’s well-being.17 
 
Quong believes that this stretches the concept beyond our common linguistic intuitions. 
On his reading of third-party cases the intention to promote another’s well-being acts as 
a marker for who is being paternalized. Because it is the child’s well-being we are 
attempting to promote, it is strange to say, as Shiffrin’s account seems to, that we are 
acting paternalistically towards the parent. If we employ her account, paternalism 
proliferates to include many common disagreements between two individuals regarding 
their actions towards a third party. 
 
At the same time Quong accuses the definition of being underinclusive because it fails to 
account for interventions motivated by a paternalistic intent, but that are not directed at 
things legitimately within the paternalisee’s sphere of control. Such cases include a 
refusal to aid another who requires something from your legitimate sphere of control to 
accomplish her act. Quong argues that such things can be withheld for paternalistic 
reasons and thus should be considered paternalistic. However these cases are not 
consistent with Shiffrin’s four criteria. 
 
Because of this tension in the original definition, Shiffrin’s account is rejected in favour of 
what Quong calls the judgemental definition.18 On this view paternalism is defined as any 
act where 
 
1. Agent A attempts to improve the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests 
or values of agent B with regard to a particular decision or situation that B 
faces. 
                                                          
17 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, p. 79. 
18 See Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, p. 80. 
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2. A’s act is motivated by a negative judgement about B’s ability (assuming B 
has the relevant information) to make the right decision or manage the 
particular situation in a way that will effectively advance B’s welfare, good, 
happiness, needs, interests or values. 
 
The judgemental definition is similar in character to Shiffrin’s four stage motivational 
account of paternalism, but it is tailored to achieve greater extensional accuracy by 
capturing a different set of interventions under the label of paternalism. Quong achieves 
this by stripping away references to the methodology of the intervention. Thus, the 
account is a purer motivational account of paternalism because it specifies that such a 
motive must be present to motivate the wrongful intervention, whilst leaving the 
description of the act relatively content-less.  
 
Which of the definitions we ought to accept will depend on how inclusive we consider an 
accurate account of paternalism should be. If one favours Shiffrin’s reliance on autonomy 
and spheres of agency, a partial defence can be made. To defend the earlier account from 
the claim of under-inclusiveness a proponent of her view might further specify the 
concept of a legitimate sphere of control. An option here is to define the spheres according 
to the possession of sufficiently weighty interests of the paternalisee. One might claim 
that such interests generate a weighty claim that allows us both to identify and to ground 
said spheres of control. Such an argument mimics the interest theory of rights to provide 
further specification and support for the argument, allowing us to explain how 
individuals may be subject to paternalism if we withhold something from them, for 
example. However the position is still arguably over-inclusive in third-party cases. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the definitions range over both their ability to explain 
the source of disrespect, and their extensional accuracy. Because of their structure, each 
account is compatible with the argument from moral status. However, as I will argue in 
the next section, this may not be the strongest account of the wrongfulness of 
paternalism. 
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4. Motivational Accounts and Their Conceptual Dependency 
 
So what are we to make of the argument from moral status? Given its modest goal of 
explaining the presumptive wrong behind a paternalistic intervention, the argument 
appears persuasive. It grounds the disrespect shown towards the subject in either (or 
both) of two distinct wrongs. The first is comparative, with ‘one party treating another as 
having inferior status’.19 The second wrong is non-comparative, as paternalistic acts 
‘involve treating an adult as if he or she (at least temporarily) lacks the ability to rationally 
pursue his or her own good’.20 These two need not necessarily coincide, though they 
commonly do so. The second condition must be a necessary condition for paternalistic 
acts characterized by the motivational account as it is a consequence of acting whilst 
motivated by a negative judgement regarding the subject’s ability to pursue his own 
good.21 Accordingly I take it that the success of an explanation of the presumptive wrong 
of paternalism depends on its success in explaining this non-comparative wrong. 
 
The argument from moral status contrasts with an alternative: the autonomy argument.22 
In what remains of this article I will show that Quong’s argument against the rival to his 
own position is far from conclusive. Although the argument correctly identifies an answer 
to the explanatory challenge, it fails to be unique as Quong does not preclude other 
accounts from providing a similar answer. Indeed I argue that the autonomy argument 
captures the non-comparative wrong of paternalism more accurately. 
 
                                                          
19 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, p. 101. 
20 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, p. 101. 
21 The comparative wrong, however, will only occur when the negative judgement contains an aspect of 
superiority (i.e. ‘I know better than you do’). One could be motivated by a negative judgement and 
consistently believe that both oneself and the paternalisee were equally subject to this failing. Indeed this 
personal insight into the failing and external perspective of another’s behaviour may be the fact that leads 
us to identify the mistake in the paternalisee’s behaviour and act to correct it. This pattern seems to fit the 
short example Quong provides; see Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, p. 101. 
22 Quong also contrasts his argument with J. S. Mill’s argument that it is the individual who possesses the 
most privileged epistemic insight into his goals and plans best, and thus any interference with the 
individual’s pursuit of her good is surely wrongful and in need of justification. See J. S. Mill, On Liberty 
(Oxford, 1991 [1859]), pp. 84–5 and 92–3. 
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The autonomy argument explains the wrong of paternalism through a focus on the 
wrongfulness of contravening the autonomous choice of an agent. Such a view rests on 
the claim of independent value that is attached to the autonomous selection of a goal: 
 
Even if someone is going to make a poor decision that will have negative 
consequences for his or her own well-being understood in the narrow sense, 
if the value of autonomous choice is generally weightier than other aspects 
of someone’s well-being, then paternalism will be at least presumptively 
wrong. And if respecting autonomy is so important that it warrants the 
protection afforded by a moral right, then paternalism will often be 
unjustified.23 
 
This view is intuitive to many liberal theorists. However, Quong rejects it for two reasons. 
First, he finds the argument overly permissive as it licences paternalistic interferences to 
promote autonomy, and second, the argument rests on a controversial claim regarding 
the intrinsic value of autonomous choice. The reasons against these characteristics stem 
from his adoption of a specifically Rawlsian conception of respect for persons (as free and 
equal citizens). 
 
Quong reaches his conclusions in favour of the argument from moral status by capturing 
the relational dynamic of paternalism. The presence of the relevant motive characterizes 
the actions of the paternaliser towards the paternalisee, and inherent in these actions is 
a certain wrong perpetrated against the moral status of the subject. Acts that deny the 
respect demanded by the moral status of the paternalisee are bound to be disrespectful. 
Understanding that respect for persons acts as a lynchpin in the argument is key to 
explaining the attractive simplicity of the motivational account as the approach allows 
the presumptive wrong of the intervention to be explained in a similar fashion to how it 
is defined. 
 
                                                          
23 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, p. 98. 
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The drive to both restrict the scope of permissible paternalistic acts and to remove 
controversial value claims from the explanation of why such acts are wrong follows from 
Quong’s commitment to a wider Rawlsian project.24 The plausibility and attractiveness of 
the argument from moral status thus depends on the validity of appealing to his Rawlsian 
intuitions (and the reasons we have for interpreting moral status in this manner) when 
considering paternalism. To agree with Quong about the strengths of the argument from 
moral status, we must agree with his wider normative framework. Specifically we must 
share his Rawlsian account of respect for persons – that citizens should be treated as free 
and equal because they possess the two moral powers. 
 
5. The Basis of Respect for Persons 
 
As it is presented, the argument from moral status rests upon Rawls’ view of a citizen as 
free and equal in a specific sense 
 
[T]he basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a 
sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of 
judgement, thought, and inference connected with these powers), persons are 
free. Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully 
cooperating members of society makes persons equal.25 
 
For the argument from moral status to be an accurate explanation of the wrong of 
paternalism, a case needs to bemade for both (i) employing this interpretation of the 
person to derive principles of respect for the status of persons, and (ii) that such 
principles are the most appropriate to be employed in characterizing paternalistic 
interventions. This is crucial for Quong’s claim because the argument from moral status 
can be formulated in a number of ways depending on how one construes respect for 
                                                          
24 Indeed the main strength that Quong claims his account possesses (aside from cohering with his 
previously offered judgemental account of paternalism) is its lack of controversial value claims; see Quong, 
Liberalism without Perfection, p. 102. 
25 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 19. 
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persons. The problem arises because the second moral power is related to the 
individual’s autonomous pursuit of the good life. Because of this one can explain much of 
the argument from moral status in terms of respect for another’s autonomy, posing a 
problem for the distinctiveness of the argument. I take it that if it can be shown that the 
non-comparative wrong of paternalism26 can be explained in terms of autonomy then the 
contrast between the two arguments is weakened severely. Further, if it can be shown 
that an argument requiring a controversial value claim better captures the wrong of 
paternalism, we may have reason to reject the argument from moral status in favour of 
its rival. 
 
This will require an account of respect for persons grounded in an argument from the 
value of personal autonomy. At this point we must answer two related questions. The 
first is whether personal autonomy can ground an account of respect for persons, and the 
second is whether it can better explain the wrongs of paternalism under the motivational 
account. I will take these two questions in turn. 
 
To consider whether personal autonomy can ground an account of respect for persons 
we must first clarify what we mean by personal autonomy and respectful actions, and the 
basis for the compatibility between the two concepts. Personal autonomy describes an 
individual’s ability to competently make authentic decisions.27 If these two conditions are 
sufficiently developed we may call an individual an autonomous agent. Respect for 
something is a form of regard towards something of value.28 As Robin Dillon explains, we 
respect something when ‘we experience the object as constraining our attitudes and 
actions, and when we respect something we heed its call, accord it its due, acknowledge 
                                                          
26 This is the most important harm, given that it is necessary to paternalistic acts under a motivational 
definition. 
27 The concept of authenticity is traditionally thought to contain the Razian criteria of independence and a 
sufficient range of options; see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986), pp. 389–90. However, 
one can also argue that it contains a wider range of conditions, for example an information requirement; 
see Ben Colburn, Autonomy and Liberalism (New York, 2010), pp. 94–8. 
28 Arguing for the appropriateness of an account of respect for persons is notoriously tricky. For the 
purpose of this article I will assess whether a balance can be struck between an account’s ability to capture 
some core normative truth about what a respectful act is meant to achieve and how well the account fits in 
with our wider normative framework. If an account can achieve this balance satisfactorily then it signals 
its suitability as an account of respect for persons. 
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its claim to our attention.’29 To ground a moral claim restricting our behaviour towards 
others, personal autonomy must be valuable enough to ground what Stephen Darwall 
calls moral recognition respect: 
 
[S]ome fact or feature is an appropriate object of respect if inappropriate 
consideration or weighing of that fact or feature would result in behaviour that 
is morally wrong. To respect something is thus to regard it as requiring 
restrictions on the moral acceptability of actions connected with it. And 
crucially, it is to regard such a restriction as not incidental, but as arising 
because of the feature or fact itself. One is not free, from a moral point of view, 
to act as one pleases in matters which concern something which is an 
appropriate object of moral recognition respect.30 
 
This is the role of the value claim that troubles Quong. Historically, arguments derived 
from Kant31 have been made for this level of importance to be given to autonomy.32 If 
such an argument can be identified successfully and it can be convincingly shown that 
autonomy is sufficiently valuable, then autonomy may act as the basis of a moral status 
claim. This status will constrain our actions towards those who possess it, preventing us 
from treating them in certain ways (thus explaining the wrong of paternalism). Several 
plausible interpretations can be identified. 
 
Quong’s position rests on a broadly Rawlsian view of the person. By attributing the two 
moral powers to individuals, Rawls effectively prohibits principles other than those ‘that 
the parties would acknowledge in the original position to protect themselves against the 
weakness and infirmities of their reason and will in society’.33 This ensures that the 
                                                          
29 Robin S. Dillon, ‘Respect: A Philosophical Perspective’, Gruppendynamik und Organisationsberatung 38 
(2007), pp. 201–12, at 203. 
30 Stephen Darwall, ‘Two Kinds of Respect’, Ethics 88 (1977), pp. 36–49, at 40. 
31 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge, 1997 
[1785]). 
32 Note here that I do not mean to conflate Kantian moral autonomy with its more substantive counterpart 
– personal autonomy. Instead here I am referencing the employment of a Kantian argument for treating 
autonomy (of any kind) as valuable in this fashion. 
33 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 249. 
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capacity to have, to revise and rationally to pursue a conception of the good acts to 
prohibit paternalistic interventions (against individuals who possess the capacity) that 
cannot be justified to the individual as a free and equal citizen. Paternalistic interventions 
are thus disrespectful and presumptively wrong because they treat citizens as if they do 
not possess this crucial component of moral personhood. This political conception of the 
person34 (and the treatment of his or her status) can trace its roots back through Rawls’s 
project of Kantian constructivism.35 Though this is not the strongest anti-paternalistic 
reading of Kant this conception of the person does prohibit many paternalistic 
interventions. 
 
However, one need not interpret moral status as prohibiting paternalistic interactions if 
such actions can promote autonomy. Another Kantian reading of respect for the status of 
persons, suggested by Joseph Raz, makes such an argument.36 The Razian reading of 
Kantian respect rejects the political interpretation that Rawls embraces, arguing instead 
that we respect value simpliciter. Raz argues that correctly responding to value has three 
stages – the acknowledgement of value, its preservation and appropriate engagement 
with it.37 When we respect persons, we respect them as sources of value. If autonomy is 
also valuable38 then an appropriate method of engaging with the value of personhood 
may be the promotion of personal autonomy. The compatibility of the two valuable 
phenomena leads to an account of respect for persons that does not prohibit paternalistic 
interferences that promote autonomy. Such an account, however, is incompatible with 
the Rawlsian character of its rival because it requires the comprehensive value claim that 
living an autonomous life benefits an individual’s well-being. This explains Quong’s worry 
regarding the over-permissiveness of the argument from autonomy in justifying 
interventions to protect individuals’ capacity to make autonomous choices.39 This 
reading of Kant differs from the Rawlsian interpretation by allowing paternalistic 
                                                          
34 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 29–35, and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 14–38. 
35 John Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. S. Freeman 
(Harvard, 1999), pp. 303–58. 
36 See Joseph Raz, Value, Respect and Attachment (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 124–75. 
37 Raz, Value, Respect and Attachment, pp. 161–4. 
38 Raz has famously argued that it is a constituent part of the good life in liberal society; see Raz, The 
Morality Of Freedom, pp. 378–95. For an alternative universal reading of the value of personal autonomy, 
see Tom Hurka, ‘Why Value Autonomy?’, Social Theory and Practice 13 (1987), pp. 361–82. 
39 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, pp. 98–9. 
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interventions that promote autonomy (an appropriate engagement of a valuable practice 
by an agent), and prohibiting acts that deny this relationship (a failure to acknowledge, 
preserve or engage with the value present in autonomous agency). 
 
Each account employs a different criterion that demands respect, either a citizen’s status 
as free and equal or a citizen’s capacity for personal autonomy. Further, each account can 
plausibly explain the presumptive wrong of paternalism in a way compatible with the 
motivational account. But troublingly for the argument from moral status, respect for 
autonomy can explain the specific wrong of paternalism in a similar fashion. This is 
because when paternalistic interventions show disrespect for the paternalisees by 
denying their ‘capacity to plan, revise, and rationally pursue their own conception of the 
good’, thus ‘treating an adult as if he or she (at least temporarily) lacks the ability to 
rationally pursue his or her own good’,40 such interventions fail to respect individuals in 
a manner that their status as agents capable of personal autonomy demands. Thus the 
appeal to moral status relies on a specific interpretation of the role personal autonomy 
plays in preventing paternalistic intervention. 
 
Further, we may have reason to question the suitability of this Rawlsian conception of the 
person as a basis for explaining the presumptive wrong of paternalism. If one holds to the 
Rawlsian interpretation of respect for persons, the capacity for personal autonomy acts 
as a precondition of moral personhood, but the extent of an individual’s personal 
autonomy above this threshold has no impact on her status. Possessing the capacity for 
personal autonomy is part of being a free and equal citizen, and thus is part of a package 
of characteristics that act as a constraint against (paternalistic) interferences that are not 
acceptable to free and equal citizens.  
 
This threshold approach is a weakness of the argument from moral status because such 
a treatment views interferences intending to promote the autonomy of the subject as 
problematic in the same sense as other interferences. By viewing the autonomy 
                                                          
40 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, p. 101. 
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argument’s acceptance of such interferences as overly permissive,41 Quong’s argument 
misunderstands the relationship between paternalism and autonomy. The moral status 
of the citizen will only succeed in prohibiting paternalistic interferences to the extent that 
it is grounded in the capacity for personal autonomy. But because the argument from 
moral status relies on Rawls’s view of the person, it employs a low threshold of personal 
autonomy to ensure that as many citizens as possible can be said to possess the moral 
powers. This prevents personal autonomy from playing its full role in explaining the 
wrong of paternalism, resulting in an oversimplified account of the wrong of paternalism. 
Though the Rawlsian position is right to give autonomy a central place, it misinterprets 
the extent to which personal autonomy matters, only employing its presence (by using a 
low threshold system) as an indicator of the wrong and thus failing to acknowledge the 
larger role it can play in identifying wrongful interferences. 
 
Consider how the moral status view treats interventions intended to promote autonomy. 
Given that it is explaining the presumptive wrong of paternalism, its proponents are 
committed to accepting that interventions to promote autonomy may be justified all 
things considered. However such interventions are presumptively wrong in the same 
fashion as other paternalistic acts (intended, for example, to increase the amount of art 
to which the paternalisee is exposed). On this view, the special dispensation we may give 
to acts intending to empower the subject and improve his ability to live his life as he wants 
in the future follows the identification of the presumptive wrong – at the later stage of 
justification. This seems unintuitive when compared to the autonomy argument’s ability 
to incorporate this dispensation at the stage of identifying the wrong. Employing the 
autonomy account, such acts will be vindicated at the earlier stage of identifying the 
wrong, because the interference constitutes no wrong through its intention to promote 
(not diminish) the individual’s personal autonomy. Employing the Rawlsian account, 
such interferences would be seen to contravene the moral status of the individual (as they 
impact on the second moral power possessed by those above the threshold), even though 
they may be designed to help foster exactly those capacities relevant to the second moral 
power. 
 
                                                          
41 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, pp. 98–9. 
18 
 
This difference in treatment is rooted in the difference between the status of a free and 
equal citizen and the status of an autonomous agent. According to the autonomy 
argument, the interferences are constrained by the subject’s status as an autonomous 
agent. Thus the full range of capacities related to personal autonomy possessed by the 
individual become relevant to the argument, and not merely the presence of autonomy 
employed as a block on intervention. It should matter how far the subject is beyond the 
threshold that Rawls takes as constitutive of moral status, with autonomy instead acting 
as a defeasible consideration in favour of not interfering. If the interference can be proved 
to pose no threat of restricting or undermining the paternalisee’s autonomous pursuit of 
her projects, then the act is not presumptively wrong. Making these judgements requires 
us to know the full extent of the subject’s capacity for autonomy, because our judgements 
will differ in different cases.42 Thus the employment of a threshold system is a misstep 
for the argument from moral status as it leads to a similar initial treatment of all potential 
interventions, thus failing to distinguish between acts that either deny or promote the 
autonomy of those above the threshold. 
 
In this respect, the autonomy argument should be considered more plausible than its 
rival as it is not guilty of treating all interferences that impact on the capacity for 
autonomy as presumptively wrong, ignoring the difference between the promotion and 
restriction of the autonomous pursuit of the subject’s goals. Instead, by relying on the 
amount of personal autonomy the subject can currently enjoy, the argument from 
autonomy is able to distinguish between types of interferences in this way. The argument 
recognizes that paternalistic acts are problematic because they interfere with how we 
intend to pursue our own good. This ensures that acts that are intended to allow us to 
better identify or pursue our own good are treated as less problematic, not as problematic 
but easier to justify. The latter Rawlsian approach appears redundant in this respect, and 
this is illustrative of its mishandling of respect for personal autonomy, yet Quong’s view 
                                                          
42 For example, in some cases the quality of autonomous decisions may be important, in others the quantity 
of such decisions, and so on. The autonomy argument is flexible enough to be able to balance the various 
dimensions of personal autonomy that will be relevant to such decisions by appeal to different elements of 
the concept. Further clarity on this point requires larger arguments that are beyond the scope of this article; 
however, it is worth noting that the argument from moral status seems poorly equipped to deal with such 
variance, because it employs a low threshold of capacities as a block on potentially paternalistic 
interventions. I thank the anonymous reviewer for drawing this to my attention. 
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is tied to this approach by his reliance on the Rawlsian account of the person. Thus I argue 
that to adequately capture personal autonomy’s role in explaining the presumptive 
wrong of paternalism we cannot employ an account of respect for persons grounded in 
the moral status of an individual that is also compatible with Rawls’s constructivism.43 
Doing so will employ the wrong metric (status not autonomy) to explain satisfactorily the 
wrong of paternalism. 
 
In a similar way to de Marneffe’s project of reconciliation, identifying this tension 
between autonomy and the Rawlsian project may simply give us reason to reject the 
harmony of our approach of paternalism with political liberalism as a sign of the 
suitability of our definition. Even though it requires a controversial value claim regarding 
the value of personal autonomy, it appears that the argument from autonomy better 
captures the fact that paternalism tracks the wrongs of interferences with our 
autonomous pursuit of the good. And given that this argument can accommodate the 
attractive parts of the argument from moral status (as it allows us to explain the non-
comparative wrong of paternalism that Quong identifies) I argue that we have a reason 
to prefer the argument from autonomy as an explanation of the presumptive wrong of 
paternalism. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this article I have defended the motivational account of paternalism against de 
Marneffe’s worry by exploring the range of positions one can take if we accept this 
definition. This definitional strategy defines paternalism as those acts which share the 
mixed motivation of care and control, and by this motive, generate disrespect towards 
the paternalisee. I have discussed a range of issues that these accounts have faced in their 
development, regarding both defining paternalism and explaining its presumptive 
wrongfulness. Further, I have defended an argument that explains the presumptive 
wrong of paternalism in terms of personal autonomy against a recent rival that seeks to 
explain the wrong in terms of the moral status of the paternalisee in Rawlsian terms. 
                                                          
43 This is not to preclude compatibility with any form of constructivism (specifically autonomy-based 
approaches). My argument here is specifically against the compatibility of Rawlsian accounts and the 
problem this may cause for the argument from moral status. 
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Finally, I have demonstrated the conceptual dependency that lies at the heart of such 
definitions, that is, between the possession of said motive and the account of respect for 
persons that is required to explain why acts motivated in this way are disrespectful. 
 
With this relationship made clear, we may find ourselves accepting a simple binary 
distinction between paternalistic acts that are respectful (and thus unproblematic or 
benign), and paternalistic acts that are disrespectful (and thus problematic and 
presumptively wrong). If it is the contravention of personal autonomy that generates the 
wrong of paternalism, then acts intended to promote our personal autonomy will be 
paternalistic, but in a benign sense as they fail to fulfil the criteria for presumptive 
wrongness. Understanding this distinction does require an account of respect for 
persons, but I believe such a move is plausible. Further, this provides us with a reason to 
discard the project of reconciliation that de Marneffe mistakenly identifies as crucial to 
progress in this area of debate. 
 
We can derive two further conclusions from the arguments I have provided. The first is 
that Quong will have to provide further support for interpreting respect for persons in 
the Rawlsian sense. Given that this is not the sole account of respect that can be employed 
to explain the wrong of paternalism in a non-comparative fashion, supporting reasons 
why we should turn away explanations based on personal autonomy are required. The 
two reasons given (that the argument may be overly permissive and that it rests on a 
controversial value claim) will only be problematic if we accept the wider Rawlsian 
framework that prioritizes the right over the good. A comprehensive liberal could happily 
dismiss both claims as unproblematic because they do not share the political liberal 
project. 
 
The second conclusion to draw from the argument is the simplest and most important. In 
recent years, it has become clear that the motivational account of paternalism is a strong 
definitional method. Quong’s recent arguments provide an important challenge that 
splits the method into two coherent opposing positions. The first employs a traditional 
account of respect for personal autonomy to explain the wrong of paternalism. This 
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requires a controversial value claim. The second employs a Rawlsian account of the 
person to explain the wrong of paternalism. I have argued that this Rawlsian account 
treats all potentially paternalistic acts in the same way. The key difference between the 
definitions is their fit with our wider normative commitments and our intuitions 
regarding the permissiveness of acts justified by their promotion of personal autonomy. 
By explaining the wrong of paternalism in terms of an infantilizing sense of disrespect, I 
have argued that motivational accounts are conceptually dependent on an account of 
respect for persons. In drawing our attention to this fact I hope that future discussion, 
critiques and defences of this interpretation of paternalism will better recognize this link 
and come to understand its implications. 
 
Word Count: 7,295. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Jonathan Quong and Liam Shields for their helpful comments on a 
draft of the article. I would also like to thank David Birks, Jessica Begon, Stephen de Wijze 
and the anonymous referee for their helpful discussions and suggestions. Finally I would 
like to thank the audience at the Brave New World Conference in Manchester to whom an 
early draft was presented. 
